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Abstract
The decentralization of governance is increasingly considered crucial for delivering development and is being widely adopted in
sub-Saharan countries. At the same time, distributed (decentralized) energy systems are increasingly recognized for their role in
achieving universal access to energy and are being promoted in sub-Saharan countries. However, little attention has been paid by
governments and energy practitioners to the dynamic interrelationships between national and local government and the role of
governance decentralization in transitioning to distributed energy systems. This paper traces the complex relationships between
accelerated delivery of distributed energy and decentralized local governance systems. The argument is grounded in an explo-
ration of two different approaches to decentralized energy systems governance in Kenya and Malawi. For Kenya, analysis
focuses on the energy sector since the adoption of the new decentralized constitution in 2010. In Malawi, it focuses on the
involvement of the authors in piloting Local Authority Energy Officers in districts under the decentralization ofMalawian energy
policy. Our analysis shows that accelerating the speed and scale of implementation for distributed energy systems and enhancing
their sustainability and socio-economic impacts is directly linked to the quality of local and national governance structures and
their interrelationships. The paper extends existing work in energy and evidence literacy for policy actors by developing an
analytical framework, to enable more effective local governance within energy access initiatives in the Global South.
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Introduction
Decentralization has been widely adopted in the Global South
to further socio-economic development (Beard et al. 2008;
Faguet 2014; Romeo 2012; Smoke 2015), particularly in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Mohmand and Loureiro 2017).
In the energy sector, distributed systems are increasingly rec-
ognized for their potential in enhancing universal energy ac-
cess goals in developing economies (UN 2018), particularly
for remote areas. Despite the spread of administrative decen-
tralization and energy systems decentralization, central gov-
ernments across SSA face continuing challenges in providing
universal energy access. To date little attention has been paid
to the crucial role of local governance and the dynamics of
national-local politics in transitioning to decentralized energy
systems.
This paper therefore investigates the interplay between po-
litical governance and distributed energy systems based on
evidence drawn from two case studies representing different
approaches to local governance of distributed energy systems
implementation. The second section outlines the methodolo-
gy. The third section reviews the literature on decentralization
to identify key factors for success to form an analytical frame-
work for the feasibility of decentralized energy systems. The
fourth section discusses empirical evidence from ongoing re-
search on local energy governance in Kenya and from piloting
district energy officers in Malawi. The fifth section compares
the experiences of governance actors and stakeholders and the
lessons learned in the two case studies. The last section
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concludes by reflecting on the implications of the findings for
future research and evolution of decentralized energy
governance.
Methodology
To understand the interplay between local governance and
decentralized energy transitions, this paper first undertakes a
review of the decentralization, energy studies and cognate
literatures from which we educe a framework of seven factors
for successful delivery of decentralized energy services.
Empirical case study evidence fromKenya andMalawi is then
presented and discussed with reference to the framework.
The literature review takes as its starting point from the UK
Government funded Renewable Energy and Decentralisation
(READ) project (see Brown et al. 2015), which found the
energy and decentralization discourses had largely been
discussed as separate entities resulting in a distinct lack of
attention being paid to decentralized energy governance roles
(Brown et al. 2015), a finding reinforced in a follow-on project
on Kenyan decentralized energy governance (Sieff 2019). The
two studies drew together literature on decentralized gover-
nance of other resources (e.g. water) and from other relevant
discourses (e.g. capacity building in the development studies
literature). This paper takes a similar approach, using insights
from the decentralization, energy studies, geography, political
economy and development studies discourses to identify key
factors affecting the scope of decentralized energy governance
to deliver distributed energy services in SSA.
Kenya andMalawi were selected as case studies as they are
currently undergoing decentralization, which incorporates ex-
tensive energy sector reforms. Case studies are an effective
means for exploring contextual details, the goal being to better
understand complex social phenomena and real-life organiza-
tional and managerial processes (Yin 2009). The comparative
experiences of the two countries are especially important as
the stakeholder engagement and implementation processes
have varied considerably, thereby offering alternative
decentralized energy systems governance pathways. This pa-
per does not seek to be an exhaustive study of experiences
from across SSA, but seeks to illuminate key factors which
could be useful for analysing decentralized energy governance
and distributed energy in two countries at different stages of
implementing changes in the energy sector as a result of
decentralization.
Kenya was selected because a swiftly evolving political
and energy context suggests that the country is well placed
to establish effective decentralized energy governance.
Kenyan political decentralization has extended rapidly since
i ts in t roduct ion in 2013 and (unl ike other SSA
decentralization processes) has evidenced genuine reform.
Cheeseman et al. (2016: 3) highlight that “decentralisation
was neither killed at birth … nor was it limited to a set of
superficial measures with little significance”. In terms of en-
ergy, the sector has been partly devolved, most notably, re-
sponsibility for county energy planning passed to the county
level.
Kenya’s energy infrastructure also seems facilitatory.
Kenya has one of the world’s largest per capita solar photo-
voltaic (PV) markets (Ondraczek 2013) and widespread mo-
bile money to facilitate payment. Despite having the appear-
ance at least of resources in place to contribute to successful
energy governance and facilitate energy access, Kenya still
has significant energy access issues, in part due to inadequate
prioritization of distributed systems. These issues and inequal-
ities challenge the assumption that decentralization automati-
cally improves service delivery (Bennett 1990; Donahue
1997), providing instructive empirical lessons on the effec-
tiveness of decentralized energy governance.
Malawi, in contrast to Kenya, appears to be adopting a
more circumspect and prudent approach to decentralized en-
ergy reforms by designing the decentralized energy role prior
to the devolved position being implemented (Buckland et al.
2017). Yet Malawi lacks the institutional capacity, resources
and innovation of Kenya’s energy sector, which the Malawi
case study outlines in drawing on action research—the com-
bination of empirical research with the practice of social inter-
vention to produce social change (Lewin 1946)—that in-
volved the piloting of district energy officers (DEOs).
Decentralization and its relevance
to the energy sector
Decentralization refers to “the transfer of authority, pow-
ers, resources, and responsibilities from central to lower-
level actors” (Wunsch 2014: 3), “a kind of governance
reform, a mechanism to bring citizens, local groups and
organizations into the policy and decision-making process”
(Berkes 2010: 491). In the 1980s, decentralization was
promoted by development agencies as a way to improve
governance and service delivery by circumnavigating the
perceived corruption, rent seeking and ethnic patronage of
the centralized state (Cheeseman et al. 2016). By the
2000s, such reforms had become a “cure-all prescription”
(Cheeseman et al. 2016: 3); a means to variously “protect
minorities, diffuse conflict, boost local development, and
bring politics ‘within the people’s reach’” (D’Arcy and
Cornell 2016: 246).
In SSA, centralized governance failings have been
viewed as the major factor underlying the inability to
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deliver equitable energy services. The former United
Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi Annan stressed that
“Governance of power utilities is at the heart of Africa’s
energy crisis. Governments often view utilities primarily
as sites of political patronage and vehicles for corruption,
providing affordable energy can be a distant secondary
concern” (Africa Progress Panel 2015: 23). Grid electricity
transmission and distribution tend to be powerful monop-
olies in the Global South and, given the tendency for rent
seeking within such monopolies (Bigsten and Moene
1996), central governments are reluctant to decentralize
the sector.
Despite these failings of centralized governance there
has been insufficient attention paid to alternative
decentralized energy governance systems (Brown et al.
2015), in contrast to the impact of decentralization on
the governance of other sectors in the Global South (e.g.
water, agriculture and forestry—see Asthana 2003; Cabral
2011; Ribot 1999) and on energy in the Global North (e.g.
Cowell 2017). The few detailed explorations of this rela-
tionship suggest that decentralized governance has signif-
icant potential benefits for the energy sector. One such
study was the UK Government-funded Renewable
Energy and Decentralization (READ) project which ex-
plored the cases of Kenya and Rwanda. Batchelor and
Smith (2014a) and Brown et al. (2015) highlight key po-
tential benefits of decentralization for enhanced energy
access: greater democratization, improved efficiency, im-
proved access for all, improved security/resilience and
greater affordability.
Decentralization has particular relevance to energy due to
“the challenges that the highly complex nature of energy in-
frastructures pose for effective governance” (Brown et al.
2015: 9). Goldthau (2014: 134) elaborates on this energy sec-
tor complexity, stressing the particular challenges of infra-
structure solutions spanning multiple scales, problems
concerning common pool resources and the interactions be-
tween the existing dominant “socioeconomic institutions, reg-
ulatory agencies, incumbent market actors and social norms”.
Decentralized energy governance solutions need to coexist
alongside centralized control to address these challenges.
Sovacool (2011: 3832) highlights that such polycentric ap-
proaches to governance—those that mix scales, mechanisms
and actors—“can foster equity, inclusivity, information, ac-
countability, organizational multiplicity, and adaptability that
result in the resolution of climate and energy related prob-
lems”. Goldthau (2014: 134) argues that “the governance of
energy infrastructure needs to be polycentric. This allows for
contextualization, experimentation and innovation, which can
lead to sustainable infrastructure solutions and learning across
scales”.
Yet, within these polycentric approaches, a critical research
gap remains concerning the role of decentralized energy gov-
ernance in Global South contexts and under what circum-
stances multi-scale governance arrangements work. Using
the differentiated case studies of Kenya and Malawi, this pa-
per addresses this gap by exploring the potential of decentral-
ization energy governance to facilitate distributed solar PV
initiatives.
Distributed energy in sub-Saharan Africa
The importance of distributed energy systems to addressing
SSA energy access issues is evident from the ongoing defi-
ciencies concerning centralized energy systems (here defined
as large-scale generation facilities which deliver energy via a
grid network and are often sited far from the point of use).
Issues with centralized systems in SSAwere outlined frankly
by the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, Kofi
Annan:
Africa’s highly centralised energy systems often benefit
the rich and bypass the poor and are underpowered,
inefficient and unequal. Energy-sector bottlenecks and
power shortages cost the region 2–4 per cent of GDP
annually, undermining sustainable economic growth,
jobs and investment. They also reinforce poverty, espe-
cially for women and people in rural areas. Africa’s
poorest people are paying among the world’s highest
prices for energy (Africa Progress Panel 2015: 8).
Annan’s critique stresses the acute need for alternatives to
centralized energy systems and their centralized governance
in order to meet the commitment of the “Sustainable Energy
for All” (SE4All) and Sustainable Development Goal 7 to
ensure “access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern
energy for all” (UN 2015).
Distributed energy systems hold considerable potential to
address the problems centralized systems pose. They offer
scope for relieving the loading of centralized grid systems,
for increasing the proportion of sustainable clean energy pro-
duction and for enhancing the reliability of supply in commu-
nities that are “under the grid” but unreliably supplied, as well
as communities that are off-grid. This can be a particularly
valuable aspect in SSA, where losses in the transmission and
distribution network are double the world average due to poor
maintenance (IEA 2014). The high cost of power relative to
income has resulted in household electricity consumption
rates in many countries in SSA being among the lowest in
the world (IEA 2019). The IEA (2019) highlights the business
case for distributed energy systems in SSA, noting that they
are the least cost option for 55% of the population (30% via
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mini-grids/25% through stand-alone systems) obtaining ac-
cess by 2030. This clear business case for distributed energy
systems challenges the status quo of prioritizing grid electric-
ity by central governments in SSA.
Distributed energy systems take many forms with different
technologies, but solar PV services (any of the services that
can be provided utilizing the electricity obtained from a PV
panel) play a major role in meeting the energy challenge in
SSA. The technology has particular relevance due to the high
solar irradiance in the region, the increasing affordability and
the modularity of the technology, which enables distributed
solar PV services to operate at different scales with different
generating capacities to address a wide range of needs (see
Table 1).
The modularity of solar PVenables the delivery of smaller
community-scale energy initiatives, whose more localized
scale would appear to be better facilitated by more locally
attuned decentralized governance. The following section dis-
cusses these potential benefits as well as the challenges for
implementing distributed solar PV services within evolving
decentralized governance structures.
Decentralized energy governance seems well placed to
play a leading role in distributed energy, principally clean
cooking and small-scale off-grid initiatives. Such technologies
are largely free from the natural monopolies inherent in grid
electricity (i.e. one state-owned grid network). Cost reductions
(particularly in solar PV) suggest the economics driving the
traditional centralized approach might no longer apply, thus
enabling greater use of distributed energy, whose more local-
ized level of operations appears to align with the remit of
decentralized governance (Levin and Thomas 2016).
Distributed solar PV energy services
and decentralization
Current provision of solar PV services across SSA is based on
complex interactions between a wide variety of stakeholders:
government (national and local), local energy officers, NGOs,
private operators, local finance and supply chains, installers
and end-users (individual, institutional and community). The
multi-scalar technical, legislative, capacity and social factors
affecting uptake of solar PV services (see below) are strongly
related to the context of broader national political regulatory
frameworks and economic models, which reflect the central-
ized ethos of much government thinking on energy. Given the
continued dominance of grid-based approaches to electricity
generation and distribution and supply, energy governance
structures remain highly centralized in most countries, al-
though some states have attempted to devolve government
responsibility to lower levels with varying degrees of success
(Batchelor and Smith 2014a).
The growth of interest in off-grid solutions to meet energy
access objectives and in particular the search for effective
models for the development of mini-grids brings energy ac-
cess firmly into the arena of community governance, with
impacts on the quality of provision of other services.
Political governance of services could be far more
decentralized than it currently is, and in many cases, access
delivery could be a function of local government. Brown et al.
(2015) give several examples of where such initiatives have
been developed, noting local level public officials—given ap-
propriate training and resourcing—can be a pivotal
stakeholder.
Drawing on such findings from a range of literatures, but
principally the decentralization and energy studies discourses,
the key technical, legislative, capacity and social factors af-
fecting the potential of decentralized energy governance to
deliver distributed energy services in SSA are outlined below
as seven framework factors (FF). These seven interrelated
factors serve as a framework for the subsequent analyses of
the Kenyan and Malawian experiences of decentralized ener-
gy governance in the “Country case studies” section.
Factors for successful decentralized energy
governance and delivery of distributed energy
services in sub-Saharan Africa
Decision-making power, autonomy and accountability (FF1)
Although decentralization in SSA has been widespread, it
has not been deep (Cabral 2011); central governments of-
ten continue to dominate partly due to notable discrepan-
cies emerging between decentralization legislation and re-
alities shaped by what Erk (2014: 536) terms “long-term
Table 1 Comparison of distributed solar PV systems for local energy provision. Power values are based on the experience of the authors as defined
ranges are not exact
Scale of solar PV service Pico solar Solar home systems (SHS) Solar water pumps Nano-grids Micro-grids
Typical power range 1–10 W 10–200 W 50 W–5 kW 1–3 kW 3 kW–100 s kW
Example services
provided
Solar lantern LED lamps
Phone charging
Fan
Radio
Drinking water
and/or irrigation
Economic activity with light
power load requirements,
e.g. egg incubation, ICT or
community TV
Greater levels of economic
activity with higher
loads, e.g. welding,
machining, milling
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structural uncodified factors—be it societal, economic,
geographic, demographic”.1 As such, sub-Saharan decen-
tralization has often most closely resembled deconcentra-
tion or delegation—weaker forms of decentralization—
rather than the fuller, political devolution (see Table 2).
These weak forms have often been used by elites to con-
solidate central power by creating positions which either
divide opposition power bases or are filled by officers
loyal to central government (Crook 2003). Examples of
these weaker forms are common to the energy sector and
illustrate how the concept of decentralization can be mo-
bilized by different stakeholders and applied to energy
policy and energy governance to serve different agendas.
These limitations reinforce the need for case study analy-
ses to help verify whether decentralization reforms have
led to genuine change in the energy sector.
Understanding potential decentralized energy governance
roles (FF2)
The READ project identified a range of different roles that
innovative local authorities have played in successful
forms of local energy governance (Brown et al. 2015).
These include situations where regional and local author-
ities have played a major role in the development of na-
tional grid and off-grid electrification initiatives in South
Africa, Brazil, Nepal, India and Chile. Some individual
municipalities and regional authorities have run their
own energy programmes, such as specific waste-to-
energy initiatives with private sector partners and funding
pilot community energy programmes.
Further roles for decentralized governance in PV services
seem likely to emerge. Recent findings from the Modern
Energy Cooking Services (MECS) programme indicate the
off-grid electric cooking sector is rapidly evolving in SSA
and likely to become cost competitive with conventional fuels
in the next 5 years (Batchelor et al. 2018). The roll out of PV
cooking needs to consider socio-cultural cooking practices—
suggesting that localized knowledge of decentralized gover-
nance is likely to be key.
However, despite this wide array of potential decentralized
energy governance roles, capacity will be key to whether these
roles are appreciated, understood and realized. In addition,
clear lines of division of responsibility between decentralized
energy services responsibilities and centralized services would
also be needed between national and local government. The
READ project noted decentralized energy governance initia-
tives in SSA are more effective where devolved roles have
been clearly demarcated.
Access to resources (FF3)
Thus far, decentralization initiatives in SSA have been wide-
spread but consisted mostly of administrative deconcentration
processes, characterized by insufficient power and resources
to match responsibilities (Conyers 2007). The READ project
noted that decentralized energy governance initiatives in SSA
are more effective when sufficient budgetary control is trans-
ferred. The READ project also highlighted, however, that
even in circumstances with limited resources, a dedicated dis-
trict energy role can play a major part in campaigning for
positive changes at a national level (for example securing
change within the regulation of the energy sector) as seen in
other countries (Bahingana and Wa Gathui 2014).
Effective coordination between levels of governance (FF4)
Both Batchelor and Smith (2014a) and Brown et al. (2015)
argue that these potential benefits are socio-culturally depen-
dent and significantly affected by the way decentralization is
1 Discrepancies between decentralization legislation and realities are also com-
mon outside of SSA in both Global South and North contexts.
Table 2 Definitions of decentralization forms and their relevance to the
energy sector (adapted from Gregersen et al. 2004; Cabral 2011)
Decentralization is commonly understood to incorporate three forms
depending on the extent to which powers are distributed and the nature of
accountability (Rondinelli et al. 1983).
Deconcentration
▪ Type of reorganization: involves the transfer of administrative
responsibilities/functions to subordinate units of government, often on
a geographical basis.
▪ Where decision-making power lies: at the centre.
▪ Energy sector example: a state energy monopoly establishes local
offices to manage local administrative issues but not to devise
independent, locally sensitive policies
Delegation
▪ Type of reorganization: consists of the transfer of responsibilities for
public functions/services to semi-autonomous public entities (also re-
ferred to as parastatals).
▪ Where decision-making power lies: mostly at the centre, with the
semi-autonomous entities implementing programmes for and ac-
countable to central government but not wholly controlled by it.
▪ Energy sector example: a vertically integrated state-run energy entity is
divided into separate semi-autonomous organizations, each responsi-
ble for a separate function of the sector: e.g. regulation, generation,
distribution, retail
Devolution
▪ Type of reorganization: transfer of governance powers and
responsibilities to sub-national levels, often via an electoral process
which leaves sub-national authorities directly accountable to local
people.
▪ Where decision-making power lies: transferred to the sub-national level
and largely outside the direct control of the central government.
▪ Energy sector example: the sub-national level assumes decision-making
control over functions of the local energy sector. These might include
planning the local electricity distribution network or providing and
maintaining local street lighting
J Environ Stud Sci
viewed and operated. The potential benefits depend on the
presence of effective multi-level coordination and consulta-
tion, in terms of competences, commitment and resources.
Other key coordination roles local authorities can play include
ensuring that NGO and private sector energy initiatives con-
nect effectively into local and regional development strategies
and local programmes in water, education and health and pro-
viding information and training about energy issues among
their local communities. The study identified that local author-
ities had a “demonstrator” role in promoting new technologies
and approaches in service delivery advocated by the state,
NGO or private sector, such as the use of clean energy tech-
nologies in powering municipal buildings.
Multi-scalar power relations and stakeholder interactions
(FF5)
Batchelor and Smith (2014a, b) suggest the quality of decen-
tralization is partly dependent on the interrelationships be-
tween different actors operating at different scales, which in
turn are shaped by underlying power dynamics. Investigating
these interactions and power dynamics is crucial to
Table 3 Potential blueprint for
the development of effective local
solar PV services governance in
localities where capacity is
lacking (Batchelor and Smith
2014a)
Attribute Characteristic (developed/prioritized in consultation with stakeholders)
Knowledge • Energy flows, systems and sources both within their control and within their influence and
outside of their control and influence
• Sustainable and renewable energy
• Units of measure for energy use
• Impact of individual and societal decision on energy development and use
• Impact of energy on development and economy
• General trends and initiatives in decentralized energy
• Basic scientific facts related to energy
Skills • Assess the credibility of information about energy
• Communicate about energy and energy use in meaningful ways, both to peer colleagues
and to wider citizens
•Make informed energy decisions based on an understanding of impacts and consequences
• Obtain, evaluate and utilize energy information from a variety of sources
• Identify energy aspects of personal and community concerns
• Reframe energy concerns where necessary to go beyond centralized delivery
Attitudes • Awareness/concern with respect to global energy issues
• Positive attitudes and values for sustainable energy
• Assumption of personal responsibility for implementing sustainable energy
• Civic orientation (concern that knowledge benefits all and is distributed equally)
Actor networks • Creation of space for dialogue within local authority
• Creation of linkages to actors outside authority concerned with energy (locally and
nationally)
• Creation of space for dialogue with citizens and citizen organizations
• Awareness of influences of “others” and discernment of vested interests
Changing
institutions
• Awareness of resources available for “energy”—within their institution, locally and
nationally
• Willingness to reassess resource allocation for energy concerns
• Developing capacity within organizations to allow them to understand and respond to
energy issues
• Influencing strategy within own and other organizations to allow them to understand and
respond to energy issues
• Influencing strategy for citizens to allow them to understand and respond to energy issues
Behaviour • Communicates information about energy issues not only as a personal concern but also as
a problem affecting the larger community
• Implements and evaluates effective policies and projects
• Encourages others to implement effective policies
• Shares information and learning
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ascertaining the effectiveness of decentralized energy gover-
nance roles. These concerns seem particularly pertinent to
solar PV where political economy factors have been shown
to be highly influential in undermining the sector (Newell and
Phillips 2016).
Power relations are likely to differ significantly by locality
with findings in the literature emphasizing that spatially con-
tingent empirical approaches (as undertaken by this paper) are
needed to uncover the on-the-ground relationships, agendas
and interactions which shape the power relations underpin-
ning forms of governance (Griffin 2012). Understanding these
spatial variations is largely dependent on analysing the com-
plex interactions between the wide variety of stakeholders
operating in the distributed PV space. Griffin (2012, p. 209)
notes that “power relations are not present in models, terri-
tories or networks: they are made and remade in relationships,
exchanges and interactions”.
Facilitating local actor networks (FF6)
A critical aspect is that new stakeholder arrangements in local
energy governance need to be able to not only navigate these
power dynamics but also engage communities and create sta-
ble actor networks (Batchelor and Smith 2014b). Recent con-
tributions to the innovations systems literature have highlight-
ed how the development of the Kenyan solar PV solar home
systems (SHS) market was driven by a range of capacity-
building initiatives undertaken by a diverse network of actors,
which enabled the market to grow by reducing the risks that
would have deterred private investment (Ockwell and Byrne
2017). Local actors are well positioned to facilitate the condi-
tions noted by the innovation systems literature for the devel-
opment of such technologies.
Local capacity (FF7)
Local authorities at least in principle are more closely associ-
ated with local communities than national government and
thus have the potential to better understand the dynamics of
local situations and local needs for PV energy services and
where community awareness raising and/or training on PV
services might be needed. For local governance to function
well in this role, the requisite capacity is critical yet often
lacking, particularly in terms of having some level of energy
proficiency to understand and weigh the options.
The skill set required for a functional local energy officer,
for example, goes well beyond a simple technical competency.
Batchelor and Smith (2014a) explore this in detail and present
a simple framework encompassing the basic range of skills.
These include the social processes of incorporating solar PV
services in everyday life. Table 3 presents a potential blueprint
for the development of effective local solar PV services gov-
ernance in localities where such capacity is lacking. Text in
italic indicates a wider more powerful role for local gover-
nance actors, beyond just efficient delivery of energy services,
to promote local interests.
Proficiency of local authority personnel needs to include an
understanding of the limitations as well as the potential of
solar PV services. It is also important that local governance
structures are aware of innovations in solar PV services being
developed, such as novel payment systems (Onyeji-Nwogu
et al. 2017), energy efficient appliances (Park and Phadke
2017) and new emerging markets for solar PV-based electric
cooking (eCook) being developed (Brown et al. 2017). Local
governance can take steps to ensure that solar PV products on
the market are of good quality (assured by relevant standards
laboratories) and lastly can provide support, not just for the
technical operation and maintenance of solar PV systems but
in devising appropriate financial models.
Country case studies
Given the success factors outlined in the previous section, this
section seeks to understand the spatio-temporal dimensions
affecting decentralization and decentralized energy systems
by focusing on two case studies, Kenya and Malawi, whose
recent, differentiated decentralization processes offer rich and
often contrasting insights into the potential of decentralized
energy governance. Both case studies provide evidence about
the quality of decentralized energy governance to support dis-
tributed solar PV energy services using the key factors
outlined in the “Factors for successful decentralized energy
governance and delivery of distributed energy services in
sub-Saharan Africa” section as a guiding framework. The ev-
idence emerging from the two countries builds on and de-
velops arguments within the existing literature, focussing on
the relationship between decentralization and energy access.
The contrasting contexts of the two countries provide scope
for a better understanding of which of the framework factors
(FF) are most critical in terms of decentralized energy gover-
nance and distributed energy services, as well as under which
circumstances they are most effective.
Kenya
Kenya is a lower middle-income country with a population of
51,393,010 (73% rural) and a mixed economy comprised of
three main sectors: services (43%), industry (16%) and agri-
culture (34%) (World Bank 2019a). Access to electricity rose
from 32% of households in 2013 to 75% by the end of 2018,
mainly as a result of grid extension initiatives driven by the
forthcoming presidential elections (IEA 2019; KPLC 2018).
However, electrification rates are far lower in rural areas,
where in 2017 access stood at 58% compared to 81% in urban
areas (IEA 2019). In addition, the government data does not
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elaborate on access disparities between rich and poor, and
quality of supply, with blackouts frequent particularly in rural
areas (ESI-Africa 2016).
Crucially, the government figures represent grid coverage
rather than actual electricity use, with many Kenyans unable
to access the available electricity due to affordability (Lee
et al. 2016). Nonetheless, inability or unwillingness to pay
for grid electricity is the key underlying reason for the large
surplus of electricity capacity (see Table 4). Maintaining this
unused capacity incurs costs, further impeding affordability
and uptake—a vicious circle. Ongoing electricity infrastruc-
ture developments and the continual downward revision of
projected demand scenarios (due to the very small amounts
of electricity used by poorer/rural households, for instance)
indicate this excess capacity is set to continue or even increase
(see Table 5).
The Kenyan electricity sector has operated as a mixed state/
private sector entity since the 1990s. The previously highly
centralized, state-run Kenya Power and Lighting Company
(KPLC) was unbundled between 1996 and 2006 as part of
conditional loans from theWorld Bank and IMFwhich sought
to liberalize the electricity sector. The discrete functions of the
electricity sector (e.g. generation, transmission, distribution,
retail) were divided among newly formed “parastatals”
(semi-autonomous public entities) while private sector partic-
ipation was enabled, particularly for independent power pro-
ducers (IPPs) to generate electricity.
At the time of the unbundling, energy roles at the district
level (the sub-national level of governance in Kenya at the
time) were not envisaged, later posing challenges for
decentralized energy governance by depriving the successor
county governments of sub-national energy capacity to inherit
(FF7). Furthermore, the liberalizing reforms did little to alter
the centralized governance of the Kenyan electricity sector.
The terms and conditions of power purchase agreements
(PPAs) for IPPs are determined by the Energy and
Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) while KPLC re-
mains the sole off-taker and retailer, and main distributor of
grid electricity, thus ensuring a de facto national government
monopoly (Fig. 1). These reforms thus clearly constitute a
form of “delegation” (Table 2), with the parastatals and IPPs
still responding and accountable to the centre (FF1).
Kenya energy policy and decentralization
The political economy of Kenya’s energy context suggests
that, despite the challenges outlined above, it is well placed
to establish an effective decentralized energy regime which
could faci l i ta te distr ibuted solar PV transi t ions.
Decentralization in Kenya, central to the constitution adopted
in 2010 and instituted after the 2013 general election, has been
cited as one of “the most rapid and ambitious devolution pro-
cesses going on in the world” (World Bank 2015). The newly
created 47 county governments have been allocated political,
fiscal and administrative powers over delivery of key services
(e.g. healthcare), with executive powers held by governors
and legislative powers by the members of county assemblies
(MCAs) (D’Arcy and Cornell 2016).
The election from each county of one senator to the newly
formed Senate and one women’s representative to the
National Assembly also provides counties with national level
representation (Fig. 2), reforms reinforced by constitutional
protections to governors and senators, specified devolved
roles in the Constitution (a regional rarity)2 and the guarantee
of at least 15% of national revenue to the counties. This means
that “in practice the Kenyan system is closer to Nigerian fed-
eralism than the sort of limited decentralisation practiced in
Malawi and Uganda” (Cheeseman et al. 2016: 15); the exten-
siveness of Kenyan decentralization means the process has
been considered a strong or even “quasi-federal” form of de-
volution (Kangu 2015), likely to lead to genuine reform and
thus offer scope for decentralized energy governance (FF1).
As part of the “Kenya Vision 2030” policy to achieve
middle-income status by 2030, energy is seen as “a key foun-
dation and one of the infrastructural ‘enablers’ upon which the
economic, social and political pillars of this long-term devel-
opment strategy will be built” (KETRACO 2017). The Kenya
Vision 2030 policy has set energy targets in line with those of
the United Nations’ SE4All strategy (SE4All 2017b) and uni-
versal access to electricity is to be achieved by 2022, 8 years
ahead of the global SE4All target (World Bank 2018).
Table 4 Kenya electricity
demand and capacity (EACREE
2019; Kamau 2019)
Year Peak demand
(MW)
Reserve margin
(MW)
Total capacity
required (MW)
Available capacity
(MW)
Excess capacity
(MW)
2018 1832 300 2132 2712 580
Table 5 Kenya projected and revised electricity demand (Batchelor
et al. 2019; EACREE 2019; Obulutsa 2019)
Year Projected demand (MW) Actual/revised demand (MW)
2020 5000 1832
2030 10,000 7200
2 The allocation of national and county government functions is found in the
Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. Thirty-five functions are allocated to
national government and 14 for county governments.
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Nonetheless, until 2019, efforts to achieve Kenya’s electri-
fication targets were governed by The GoK 2006, introduced
before decentralization and containing almost no guidance for
devolved electricity roles. This was compounded by the struc-
ture of the new Constitution (GoK 2010),3 which provided
only a broad overview of county energy roles, stipulating the
main county function as “planning and development [of] …
electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation” but pro-
viding no specifics of what that planning should encompass
(Table 6). The roles also appear to overlap national govern-
ment functions, with county government responsible for
“electricity and gas reticulation and energy regulation” (FF2).
In cases of overlap, the Constitution (article 186(2)) states
jurisdiction is “concurrent” (i.e. shared), but the Constitution
does not explicitly demarcate concurrent functions, which in-
stead “must be determined through interpretation” as Kangu
(2015: 193) explains. Where concurrent roles are identified,
article 6(2) calls for negotiation, stating that “The govern-
ments at the national and county levels are distinct and inter-
dependent and shall conduct their mutual relations on the basis
of consultation and cooperation”—a clear nod to the stake-
holder coordination identified in FF4—where roles are clearly
not sufficiently demarcated or understood (FF2); however, it
remains doubtful how feasible that coordination is.
The Constitution’s lack of specificity concerning energy
roles contrasts markedly with the breakdown provided for
other sectors such as agriculture and health, suggesting the
devolution of energy was not clearly envisaged. Indeed, there
was tacit understanding at the time of the Constitution’s
unveiling of the need to clarify energy roles, with an energy
bill to replace the GoK 2006 being considered during
President Kibaki’s second administration (2008–2013). The
first draft (the Energy Bill 2015) was not released until 2015
and not promulgated until March 2019 when the GoK 2019
was introduced.
The Energy Bill 2015 and GoK 2019 provide a detailed
breakdown of national and county energy roles,4 revealing
that the energy sector in Kenya has only been partly devolved.
Most key grid electricity functions are still held at national
level, including energy policy, generation and high voltage
transmission (FF1). Functions which have been devolved ap-
pear to provide some opportunities to establish a platform for
effective local energy governance and better understanding of
local needs (principally energy planning) which requires
county governments to prepare county energy plans that feed
into national energy planning (FF7). These documents recog-
nize the role of distributed energy and are expected to form the
basis for county governments to plan and implement solar PV
initiatives.
To date, there is little or no provision for autonomous,
streamlined county level decision-making as all regulatory
oversight in the electricity sector is held by the national gov-
ernment (FF1, 5). While this is understandable with grid elec-
tricity for reasons of national coordination, the need for na-
tional government permissions for distributed energy initia-
tives (which are not for own use—Day et al. 2019) makes less
sense. These systems could run autonomously or in parallel to
3 The Constitution of Kenya (Kenya), 27 August 2010, available at: https://
www.refworld.org/docid/4c8508822.html (accessed 19 March 2020)
4 The list of national and county functions is the same in both the Energy Bill
2015 and GoK 2019.
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the grid and the stringent regulatory requirements are likely to
disincentivize county interventions.
In addition, several of the energy functions in the GoK
2019 are concurrent and lack clear demarcation of where na-
tional government responsibility ends and that of the county
starts, impeding coordination (FF4). This has the potential to
lead to ambiguity over responsibilities and possibly erroneous
shifting or assuming of roles (FF2), particularly in the case of
the concurrent function of land rights (for energy projects), an
emotive issue which could create intergovernmental tension
(FF5). County uncertainties over roles have been exacerbated
by the continued predominance of the electricity parastatals
since devolution, which have only undergone limited internal
restructurings to accommodate the decentralization process.
Meanwhile, KPLC has established offices in all 47 counties
to aid the management of county administrative issues, a re-
form the Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy
Corporation (REREC) is also in the course of implementing.
While this redistribution of personnel has aided accountability
by bringing those responsible for service provision closer to
the people they serve, the restructuring constitutes a form of
deconcentration as sub-national offices have little to no polit-
ical or financial autonomy from their Nairobi head offices
(FF1). The other four parastatals (EPRA, GDC, KenGen and
KETRACO), whose activities operate at a more national scale
and are less customer facing, have remained centralized, op-
erating from head offices in Nairobi.
The limited restructuring of the electricity sector and lack
of clear provision for county electricity roles seems to imply
that deconcentration is what the national government would
prefer, rather than autonomous, political and fiscal decentral-
ization that might lead to resources and revenues being drawn
from the centre. To date, resources continue to be consolidated
in national government grid interests, potentially at the ex-
pense of bottom-up distributed electricity initiatives where
national government would have less control (FF3). Given
that energy is one of the top three most lucrative ministries
(Wafula 2017) and alleged to be subject to elite capture
(Musau 2018), the central government preference for decon-
centration seems to reflect how energy, more than other re-
source areas, is seen as too politically and financially impor-
tant to fully devolve. A reluctance to cede power is character-
istic of decentralization processes in both the Global South
and North (FF5) (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2003).
Distributed energy systems in Kenya
Current distributed energy provision consists of 21 parastatal
run mini-grids generating 67.6 MW (2.5% of total installed
capacity) (Table 7) and at least 40 smaller private or commu-
nity run systems totalling around 500 kW (Day et al. 2019). In
addition, there are 700,000 households with stand-alone SHS
(Alupo 2018)—the world’s second largest SHS market after
China (Ondraczek 2013). There is a critical need for further
Table 6 Allocation of energy
functions in the Constitution of
Kenya (GoK 2010)
National government function County government function
Energy policy including electricity and gas
reticulation and energy regulation (31)
County planning and development (8) including (e) electric-
ity and gas reticulation and energy regulation
Street lighting (5b)
Function number as listed in the Constitution provided in brackets
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distributed energy solutions—grid extensions alone will not
reach the entire population of Kenya due to the dispersed
nature of Kenya’s large rural population and low energy de-
mand, which leaves grid extension initiatives to those areas
logistically and economically unfeasible. An extensive World
Bank funded report found that 1.1 million households (10.2%
of the national total)—mostly in the 14 historically marginal-
ized arid and semi-arid (ASAL) counties—are beyond the
grid’s viable reach and require distributed energy solutions
(Alupo 2018).
As the minimum value of the solar resource in Kenya
stands at a monthly average of 4.7 kWh/m2/day and is even
higher in the ASAL counties, solar PV-distributed systems
offer particularly significant opportunities to address this elec-
tricity access issue (WorldClim 2017). The Kenyan National
Electrification Strategy envisages 35,000 of the households
beyond the grid’s reach will be connected via mini-grids, the
other 1,070,000 through SHS (Alupo 2018). This represents
an opportunity particularly for counties whose localized scale
is favourable for facilitating the conditions the innovation sys-
tems literature cite as crucial: namely, counties well-placed to
build networks of diverse local stakeholders, conduct market
research, raise awareness and fund experimental initiatives to
foster community scale distributed solar PV (Ockwell and
Byrne 2016).
A defining role for decentralized energy governance
of distributed solar PV services in Kenya?
Despite the potential for county government to play a key role
in distributed energy, county interventions have thus far been
limited. The delay over the Energy Bill 2015 for the first
6 years of devolved government created ongoing legislative
uncertainty over county roles; many counties were under-
standably unwilling to devote time and limited resources to
roles which might not exist. This is perhaps most vividly il-
lustrated by the fact that nearly half the 47 county administra-
tions did not have an energy department within their permitted
10 ministries during their first terms—a clear impediment to
developing local capacity (FF7).
The reluctance to innovate has also been exacerbated by
national government prioritization of resources towards grid
extension initiatives (Table 8) (FF3). State support for solar
PV services has been lacking; feed-in tariffs have been set too
low by the government to attract investment, largely reflecting
the interests of state institutions (Newell and Phillips 2016).
This has led to investment focussing on the national level and
policy favouring centralized electricity technologies, such as
geothermal, rather than distributed alternatives (Ockwell and
Byrne 2017).
The pursuit of centralized electricity limits the scope for
policy which best aligns with Kenya’s own development pri-
orities (Newell and Phillips 2016) (FF5) and appears to have
contributed to energy being under-resourced by counties
(FF3). In particular, the lack of county energy departments
seems to have been partly due to a misunderstanding of roles
within some county governments, who see energy as grid-
based electricity centrally generated from national govern-
ment (FF2, 3). This perception of energy as still essentially a
national function is undoubtedly a perception encouraged in
socio-political systems in which the ability to act as gatekeep-
er to electricity and thereby modernity is a valuable political
resource (FF5).
Cost is another key barrier to county government interven-
tions in larger distributed solar PV mini-grids, particularly as
communities living outside the current and predicted reach of
the grid tend to be more dispersed, poorer, low energy con-
sumers (Ndii 2019). This creates a lengthy payback period for
the large upfront capital expenditure required, necessitating
subsidies likely beyond the reach of county governments
and/or private sector investment (FF3). Indeed, despite the
fiscal provisions of the Constitution, frequent criticism tabled
by the counties5 is that funding is not sufficient for the respon-
sibilities devolved (Cheeseman et al. 2016).
The primary initiative to expand mini-grids is a joint na-
tional government/donor venture, the World Bank financed
“Kenya Off-Grid Solar Access Project” (KOSAP), which
aims to provide off-grid electricity to the 14 ASAL counties
(Kenya Power, 2017). However, this initiative seems likely to
further disincentivize decentralized governance in the sector,
as acknowledged by the World Bank:
Programs as KOSAP are seen as hindering innovation
and additional revenue streams, putting control back
with KPLC that already enjoys a quasi-monopoly.
Some suggest that MoEP6 and ERC consider leaving
existing agreements unchanged; and keep the market
open for models that work outside the KOSAP program,
which comes with limited funding (ESMAP 2017, p.
41).
5 Interviews conducted with senior energy officers from Nakuru, Nairobi and
Turkana county governments in 2017.
6 MoEP (Ministry of Energy and Petroleum) was separated into the Ministry
of Energy and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mining in 2018.
Table 7 Kenya
distributed electricity
(off-grid) capacity
(IRENA 2019; ESMAP
2016)
Energy source Capacity (MW)
Solar 36.8
Hydro 6.4
Other RE 0.7
Diesel 23.7
Total 67.6
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This recognition that major national government distributed
electricity initiatives such as KOSAP can potentially limit
innovation and create conditions likely to be detrimental to
decentralized governance interventions and the distributed
electricity sector more broadly (Byrne et al. 2014) (FF4, 6).
Other donor interventions such as the DfID Green Mini Grid
Facility Kenya initiative (GMG 2018) and GIZ Pro Solar pro-
ject adopted similar approaches (GIZ 2018).
The predominance of national government over off-grid
systems may also be detracting from the more feasible role
counties could play in smaller community level off-grid sys-
tems and SHS, which have lower costs and payback periods.
County led initiatives in this field have been limited, with
collaborations on initiatives such as the donor driven SONG
project in Nakuru an isolated example of what such interven-
tions could achieve (Blanchard et al. 2017). A far more prom-
inent energy feature of the first term CIPDs have been street-
light programmes, some solar PV, which are highly visible
and therefore have political prestige. While it appears populist
(rather than decision-making in the interests of overall devel-
opment) street lighting has been prioritized over other energy
access initiatives, being one of the few clearly demarked coun-
ty specific functions (FF7).
County interventions to facilitate SHS initiatives have also
been limited due to a perception that the SHS market is al-
ready dominated by well-established private sector players,
such as M-Kopa and D-light. The widespread use of mobile
money in Kenya to facilitate payment has likely further ad-
vanced the dominant perception of SHS as a market driven
phenomenon (Van der Plas and Hankins 1998; Jacobson
2007). More recent analyses however suggest that develop-
ment of the PV market was heavily dependent on donor
funding, which helped create demand, build networks and
absorb risks that the private sector alone could not shoulder
(Ockwell and Byrne 2017) (FF2). This suggests that lack of
county interventions in SHS constitute missed opportunities,
through coordination activities and (potentially) subsidizing
local stakeholders and capacity-building activities (FF4, 6).
The limited appreciation by county governments of the roles
they could play in distributed solar PV highlights the need for
critical county capacity issues to be addressed, if the benefits
of multi-stakeholder decentralized governance are to be real-
ized (FF7).
Various actors (transnational, national and local) have engaged
in capacity building with county governments but these interven-
tions have been spatially uneven: some counties have received far
more assistance than others (FF5). For instance,GIZ has supported
the county governments of Marsabit, Turkana and Narok to de-
velop their county energy plans, resulting in a greater emphasis on
distributed solar PV which partly reflects GIZ’s own interests in
developing the solar industry.
The Kenyan Association of Manufacturers has engaged in
capacity building with the seven counties containing the largest
urban centres, reflecting interests in business and commerce and
leading to a more prominent focus on energy efficiency and
creating an enabling environment for clean energy investment
(KAM/CEEC 2017). These examples highlight the potential of
counties which do not have features which align with external
stakeholder interests to be left behind (FF7).
Malawi
Malawi is a low-income country predominantly comprised of a
rural population and heavily reliant on agriculture. According to
Table 8 Largest national government led initiatives in each energy sub-sector by US$ of investment (Kenya Power 2017; Anyanzwa 2018; Kipsang
2018; European Union (EU) 2019; World Bank 2019b; CIO 2019)
Energy sub-sector Projects Financed by Investment
Grid electricity LMCP (phases I and II) World Bank (US$450), AfDB (US$270),
Government of Kenya (US$30 M), EU (33 M)
US$783 M
DLP Government of Kenya US$267 M
Off-grid electricity Kenya Off-Grid Solar Access
Project (KOSAP)
World Bank US$150 M
Table 9 Malawi electricity
demand and capacity projections
(GoM 2017a, b)
Year 2014 2018 2022 2026 2030
Peak demand forecast (MW) 378 720 1300 1950 2550
Reserve margin (MW) 69 104 162 227 287
Total capacity requirement (MW) 447 824 1462 2177 2837
ESCOM (utility) supply (MW) 351 429 429 429 429
Capacity supply shortfall (MW) − 96 − 395 − 1022 − 1748 − 2408
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the Sustainable Energy for All Global Tracking Framework
(SE4ALL 2017a), access to electricity in Malawi in 2014 was
18% overall: 11.4% from grid, 6.6% from off-grid solar
(National Statistics Office 2019), 46.1% in urban areas and only
4.7% in rural areas (UN 2017). Therefore, about 14.4 million
people inMalawi have no electricity, and those with grid access
regularly experience blackouts and brownouts. Generally, elec-
tricity supply in Malawi does not meet the demand of the pop-
ulation and the deficit is expected to steadily increase to
2408 MW by 2030, as shown in Table 9.
Until 2017, the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi
(ESCOM) was the sole centralized electricity supply service
provider, responsible for all generation, transmission and dis-
tribution of electricity. In January 2017, ESCOM was
unbundled to form the Energy Generation Company
(EGENCO), responsible for electricity generation, with
ESCOM now responsible for transmission and distribution
(GoM 2018). As part of the restructuring, independent power
producers (IPP) can now operate in Malawi and private ser-
vice providers can also participate in providing off-grid ser-
vices. The restructuring has led to some developments that
have increased the installed capacity to 501.7 MW
(422.9 MW by EGENCO comprising 371.2 hydro and 51.7
generators; 78 MW by Aggreko-diesel fired and 0.83 MW by
a grid-connected solar managed by ADL at the Kamuzu
International Airport). The Malawi Rural Electrification
Programme (MAREP) fund has been used to extend the na-
tional grid to 435 trading centres by 2015 (GoM 2015)—an
example of delegation (FF1). The effect has been a focus on
grid extension, with minimal government efforts on off-grid
solutions until recently, stymying overall access to electricity
in the country.
Malawi energy policy and decentralization
The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy III (MGDS
III) (GoM 2017b) included energy as one of the key priorities
and outlines key objectives including ensuring reliable supply
of electricity to key social and economic development areas
and promoting private sector investment in energy generation
and distribution through public-private partnerships (PPPs)
and independent power producers (IPPs). Regarding renew-
able energy, the MGDS advocates promoting the production
and use of affordable alternative sources of energy, promoting
the use of energy efficient technologies and designs and en-
hancing use of renewable and clean energy among under-
served communities (GoM 2017b).
The energy-related goals of the MGDS are located within
the context of the Malawian government’s current National
Energy Policy (NEP) to make the energy sector robust and
efficient in support of the government’s agenda of poverty
reduction and sustainable economic development (GoM
2018). Learning lessons from the preceding energy policy
(2003) which was grid-centric with little mention of off-grid
services, the 2018 energy policy demonstrates an aspiration to
supply reliable, modern energy options for the whole popula-
tion and reflects the need for policies to address the expansion
of decentralized, small-scale and household-level energy. The
inclusion of distributed energy as a focus in the new energy
policy reflects the move towards decentralized governance
and an understanding of potential roles (FF2).
The current Malawi National Energy Policy established a
goal of reaching 80% electricity access by 2035 and to in-
crease renewable energy deployment by 2030, including the
deployment of 50 “green” mini-grids (GoM 2018). Further
policy commitments include promotion of SHS through in-
centives, subsidies and tax breaks to investors. The Malawi
Renewable Energy Strategy (GoM 2017a) contains targets
specific to off-grid solar, including actions to complete a study
into impacts of additional fiscal incentives (such as VAT re-
lief), adopt and enforce international standards for solar prod-
ucts, review import licence applications and ensure all im-
porters of solar PVequipment are licenced.
Malawi’s Decentralisation Policy 1998 devolves adminis-
trative and authority political for service delivery with several
sectors (e.g. health, education and agriculture) to District
Councils with responsible officers employed by district gov-
ernments (GoM2005). However, to date, energy has generally
been dealt with at central government level with no district
officers responsible solely for energy (IEA 2017). Although
policies and initiatives indicate a willingness in government to
address energy access for rural communities in a proactive and
innovative manner, the realities on the ground indicate that
much remains to be done. The lack of effective multi-level
coordination and consultation has slowed the implementation
of energy policies at a local level (FF4).
Slow progress to decentralize energy is due to a combina-
tion of factors, most notably issues of local capacity (FF7)
including the technical and energy literacy required to under-
stand energy decisions, a lack of qualified personnel to certify
decentralized energy systems and the capacity to access infor-
mation on energy possibilities for citizens and government
awareness campaigns on matters such as energy efficiency
and technology dissemination. Other challenge areas include
the multi-sectoral nature of energy development in the context
of weak existing governance structures for the energy sector in
the Ministry for Energy (FF6), the limitations of a focus on
grid extension as well as sub-standard and counterfeit energy-
related products on the market (Business Innovation Facility
(BIF) 2014a).
Distributed energy systems in Malawi
In Malawi, distributed and renewable solutions are seen as
essential to achieving “energy for all” by 2030 (IEA 2017).
Supported by reductions in technology costs in recent years,
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new options such as Solar PV energy kiosks and micro-grids
are proving feasible for meeting lower tier electricity needs
(ESMAP 2014) (Roche and Blanchard 2018). In addition,
innovative social business models that combine community-
based approaches with entrepreneurship are demonstrating
improved sustainability (Munro et al. 2015; Katre et al.
2018) and have high potential for success in Malawi.
Table 10 shows solar mini-grids in operation in Malawi.
Mini-grids are allowed to charge a cost-reflective tariff, which
is typically more expensive than the grid supply.
Malawi’s off-grid solar PV installed capacity increased
from 0.2 MW in 2007 to 10.4 MW in 2016 (IRENA 2017)
and sales of Pico Solar Products (PSP) is an active yet nascent
market inMalawi, although currently less than 2.5% of house-
holds (673,000 people) own a PSP (Business Innovation
Facility (BIF) 2014b). SHS are offered by commercial com-
panies registered with MERA such as Powered by Nature and
CEM Trading, and a variety of innovative solar delivery
models have been piloted across Malawi including energy
kiosks implemented byRENAMA.However, the sector is still
young and learning on sustainable models for off-grid electri-
fication in theMalawian context are yet to be well established.
Rural energy projects in Malawi typically include aspects of
community ownership and operation and target a public
facility such as a primary school or health centre
(Dauenhauer and Frame 2016). Despite providing high
short-term social impact, several of these projects have fallen
short of sustainability expectations, typical of the historical
experience with off-grid renewable energy projects in SSA
(Martinot et al. 2002; Chaurey and Kandpal 2010).
In 2012, there were an estimated 7000 off-grid PV systems
installed, although the number in operation is unknown
(Zalengera et al. 2014). There appear to be few case studies
of sustainable rural energy business models in Malawi with
adequate capacity to operate and maintain the systems and the
collection of tariffs enabling cost recovery of capital invest-
ment within a reasonable timeframe, as well as operation and
maintenance costs. Across Malawi, repairs and maintenance
capacity and the networks of expertise required to undertake
and provide education and information on these vital systemic
areas of work are lacking, thus creating a barrier to diffusion of
off-grid energy technologies (FF7).
Some evidence for sustainable solar business models
comes from initiatives such as the Community Energy
Development Programme through the Scottish government-
funded Malawi Renewable Energy Acceleration Programme
(University of Strathclyde 2015) which focuses on communi-
ty support with village energy committees formed to establish
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Table 10 Summary of solar mini-grids in Malawi (Zalengera et al. 2019)
Location District Size of solar micro-/mini-grid (kW)
Nyamvuu Nsanje 30
Chimombo Nsanje 15
Mwalija Chikhwawa 15
Oleole Chikhwawa 15
Sitolo Mchjinji 80
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ownership for the project and Revenue Generating Activities
(RGA) to pay for operation and maintenance (FF7). Each
project operates under a community-based organization and
the community ownership element was found to be key for
sustainability. In these projects, SHS units were rented from
teachers at schools and cash sales for solar lanterns formed
part of the overall financial scheme. Plans to diversify include
the provision of power at schools, barbershops, mobile charg-
ing and other services. Success of the project hinged upon
coordination of a multitude of different organizations to en-
sure project sustainability (FF6).
A defining role for district energy officers in Malawi?
Malawi’s National Energy Policy (MNEP) 2018 outlines that, by
2023, a district energy officer (DEO) programme to support en-
ergy sector decentralization is expected in all Malawi’s districts
(GoM 2018). Indeed, prior to the new energy policy, the
Department of Energy Affairs was the only government depart-
ment in Malawi that did not have an officer at district level. The
MNEP states that theMinistry responsible for Local Government
and Rural Development will be involved in identifying sites for
rural electrification and the promotion of alternative energy
sources in districts and supporting the DEOs.
Since 2017, the role of a DEO has been piloted by social
enterprise Community Energy Malawi (CEM) in Dedza and
Balaka districts with support from the University of
Strathclyde, UK. CEM are feeding the results back to the GoM
to inform the rollout of their DEOprogramme. Early negotiations
were undertaken by CEM with the Government of Malawi to
map a proposed role ofDEOs and how itmight relate to local and
national structures (see Fig. 3) (FF4, 6, 7). The DEO is envisaged
as being an interlocutor between community level structures such
as Village Development Committees and national level authori-
ties including the Malawi Energy Regulatory Authority
(MERA). Thus, the DEO can identify energy regulatory matters
that need to be reported toMERA from district level and beyond.
Simultaneously, MERA can utilize the DEO to disseminate en-
ergy regulation matters at the district level and beyond. The
position of DEO also permits further decentralization of energy
roles in the form of Energy Extension officers.
As part of this process, a paper was presented to the GoM
(Buckland et al. 2017), outlining recommendations for the
decentralization process and activities for the DEO. The activ-
ities for such a decentralized role in Malawi were categorized
into three main areas and represented in Fig. 4.
1. Information exchange: “Energyscaping” the district, dis-
seminating government policies, collaborating closely
with related sectors, sourcing credible technical energy
information, representing energy education in local
communities
2. Facilitating energy projects: Identifying and facilitating
feasible community led projects, actively supporting the
implementation of sustainable community projects
3. Review: Social and economic impact assessments to cal-
culate value for money from supporting off-grid energy
and electricity developments alongside the existing grid
extension framework.
Table 11 elicits the experiences of the two pilot DEOs and
how these reflect the seven Framework Factors outlined in the
“Factors for successful decentralized energy governance and
delivery of distributed energy services in sub-Saharan Africa”
section. The remit for DEOs included the following: working
with the existing district structure and extension workers to
advise on energy issues; providing targeted district training for
high impact energy information dissemination; recording
challenges faced by the communities on energy issues; and
Fig. 4 Proposed activities for the
DEOs (Buckland, 2017)
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identifying, supporting and developing promising community
energy projects.
The experiences documented in Table 11 as well as the role
description above highlight that the DEOs are pivotal in
implementing many of the framework factors. The social im-
pact measurement allows for central government to make bet-
ter informed decisions on resource allocation (FF3). DEOs
have better understanding of local solar PV services and ac-
cordingly have potential to raise awareness and could be
trained in product knowledge to advise on the quality of prod-
ucts to help communities make decisions on economic uses of
distributed, solar-generated electricity (FF7). Being in contact
with organizations involved in energy at a district level includ-
ing NGOs, private sector and research institutions, they facil-
itate actor networks (FF6) as well as coordinate stakeholder
interactions (FF5). By sharing information from a grassroots
level on energy issues, they assist with central government
planning and policy decisions, facilitating effective coordina-
tion between levels of governance (FF4) and the experience
on the ground helps to understand potential roles (FF2) and
inform decision-making and promote autonomy at a district
level (FF1). For the DEO to function well, capacity building
and accountability at the local level were required and a bud-
get required to support interventions (FF1, 3, 7).
Although the energy sector lags behind the rest of
Malawian governance as regards decentralization, progress
is being made through careful strategizing evidenced by the
newly established DEO programme. These moves will act as a
supporting nexus for all sectors of government and will have
ripple effects across the breadth of governance. When moving
away from centralized supply, the Malawian case study points
out that for poor, dispersed rural communities, electricity sup-
ply is not enough. Projects must be designed to be run as
businesses by the communities themselves and enhanced live-
lihoods components to increase community income must be
built in, rather than assumed to evolve from the provision of
electricity. The case study demonstrates that the socio-
economic impact and sustainability of the distributed energy
systems is linked to the presence and quality of dedicated local
and national governance structures and actors and their
interrelationships.
Discussion
Decentralized energy governance in Kenya strongly suggests
that the unwillingness of the national government to cede
effective power to devolved units presents a significant barrier
to deployment of solar PV services and their ability to deliver
sustainable long-terms benefits for communities (FF1). This
has implications for states such as Malawi in respect of the
current centralized situation. However,in Malawi, the relative-
ly less powerful and developed grid utility and the more
fragmented party-political environment are not directly com-
parable to energy structures and politics in Kenya. Both states
have unbundled the functions of their state energy suppliers,
KPLC in Kenya and ESCOM inMalawi, but in different ways
and over different periods of time. In neither case has this
resulted in central government relinquishing power. Instead,
it has led to “delegation” (FF1) via the creation of additional
national government institutions to take on the separated roles
(KETRACO for transmission in Kenya; EGENCO for gener-
ation in Malawi). The experience in both Kenya and Malawi
highlight the different roles that local authorities can play in
governing distributed energy (FF2).
Table 11 Experiences of the
district energy officer programme
in Malawi (left hand side drawn
from Eales 2019)
Experience of DEO programme Framework
factor
Evidence that “energy awareness” of community members and decision-makers at the district
level has significantly increased when compared to the pre-DEO era.
FF7
Increase in knowledge has unveiled a proliferation of sub-standard energy products in local
markets, leading to calls for more regulations and standards for energy product quality
control.
FF6
Comprehensive “energyscaping” has revealed surprising ability to pay for energy in some
demographics. For example, where diesel generators are being used at a massive cost to the
consumer, the barrier to adoption is confusion about how to proceed with renewable energy
projects rather than affordability.
FF4
The development of social and economic impact measurement tools for quantifying social
return on investment is essential to justify energy interventions against spend and allows for
off-grid projects to be assessed directly against other forms of developments, such as
national grid extension
FF3
The use of mobile data collection for virtual energyscaping is a highly effective way to capture
and “heat map” district energy activity, targeting information dissemination to local and
national government decision-makers and allowing tracking of SDG7 progress.
FF4
Risks to mitigate for sustainable roll out include securing financial and human resources,
clarifying roles between district and central government
FF2
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Both states see energy as key for socio-economic develop-
ment and are keen to promote public private partnerships and
the use of independent power producers, but the Kenyan de-
centralization experience has only seen private investment
channelled into government-controlled grid electricity. This
implies that Malawi will need a clear policy framework (so
far lacking in Kenya) for the timeline for the rollout of the grid
and a clear understanding of how off-grid deployments are to
be integrated once or if the grid arrives (FF5).
The clarity of signals from legislation are also critical if
decentralized governance in countries such as Malawi is to
effectively operationalize solar PV policy. The 2019 Energy
Act has only partly devolved energy, leaving the grid predom-
inantly in the hands of the national government. This has
contributed to a marked grid extension and prioritization of
private sector models by national and transnational actors over
community led PV solar schemes (Brown et al. 2015). A
dependence on donors (FF5) favouring large-scale electricity
generation projects has also significantly shaped energy policy
(Newell and Phillips 2016).
Further legislative ambivalence can be seen in the lengthy
impasse over the 2019 Kenya Energy Act, which has left
county governments in limbo regarding the roles they should
adopt. The previous GoK 2006 was the key source of guid-
ance for the first 6 years following the 2013 implementation of
devolution despite not containing provision for county gov-
ernments. The Kenyan experience indicates a clear need for
national and county roles to be more clearly defined to avoid
overlapping roles (FF4), most notably over land rights. The
DEO role in Malawi appears an important step towards
avoiding this uncertainty being repeated. Indeed, an interest-
ing paradox is at play between the two countries in that
Malawi is planning to introduce DEOs whose roles are being
pre-defined, while Kenya’s constitution devolved energy roles
prior to defining them, contributing to many counties not
assigning a person to undertake these roles. The Malawian
approach clearly seems preferable although not a guaranteed
marker of success given the frequent gap between the on-the-
ground realities of decentralization reforms in SSA and their
legislative blueprints (Erk 2014).
Underpinning the analysis above is the issue of capacity
and capacity building (FF7). Local capacity building in both
countries needs to be prioritized for carrying out the roles
prescribed by legislation. In Kenya, county-level administra-
tions often lack personnel, capacity and resources to develop
energy plans and do not understand what investors want and
what repercussions there might be (Brown et al. 2015). The
effects of these shortcomings are clearly seen in the lack of
off-grid PV service initiatives by county governments who
primarily see energy as grid-based electricity and a national
government responsibility.
Thus, local energy governance capacity must be built and
encouraged from the onset in decentralization initiatives. This
is particularly vital for Malawi if significant cross sectoral
socio-economic impacts are to be realized. There is a need
for local level understanding of how decentralized energy is
critically integrated with other sectors to avoid it being
neglected. Therefore, discussion and learning between the var-
ious stakeholders undertaking decentralized energy activities,
along with platforms facilitating the sharing of information
among stakeholders, is critical if decentralized energy gover-
nance opportunities are to be realized (Johnson et al. 2016;
Brown et al. 2015).
Conclusions
The analysis above uses two specific country contexts to ex-
plore the relationship between distributed decentralized solar
PV services, political decentralization and local governance.
The paper points out that decentralization is not a pre-
determined process or set of actions, but rather a set of poten-
tials and possibilities dependant on the seven factors identified
in the analytical framework. The inherently “decentralizable”
quality of solar PV technologies can act at multiple scales that
dovetail into multiple energy possibilities in a way that cen-
tralized provision is unable to. The widespread deployment of
solar PV can also alleviate local, regional and national depen-
dency on expensive fossil fuels. All forms of distributed en-
ergy, but particularly solar PV in SSA, exploit the idea of
multiple scalar possibilities for energy supply.
Decentralization by itself is no silver bullet; there are no guar-
antees implicit in decentralization of political governance and the
literature and evidence give many reasons for concern.
Decentralization in Kenya has been under way for some time,
while symbolic moves in Malawi have been under way for even
longer. However, the results are mixed: decentralization in
Malawi’s more fragmented party-political system may be more
effective than in the political environment dominated by two
coalitions in Kenya. On the other hand, Kenya’s relative wealth
and experience with solar PV give it a substantial advantage
where decentralization of energy is concerned. Decentralization
must be tailored to the historical, path-dependent development of
an individual country. The effectiveness of devolved governance
depends on the dynamics of complex networks of power, just as
it does for the effectiveness of central governance.
Moreover, as an East African economic powerhouse, Kenya’s
position in intensifying globalization makes it both far more de-
pendent on and able to use international capital and technology
flows. Therefore, local energy governance in Kenya is not just
local, it relates to localized access to and relationswith transnation-
al capital and global institutions (Newell and Phillips 2016).
Malawi on the other hand is more detached from transnational
networks and the introduction of widespread usage of solar PV
there has just begun; it starts from a very different place than
Kenya, geospatially, socio-culturally and technologically.
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Further research on the evolving situation in Kenya and
Malawi, as well as beyond the experiences of these two coun-
tries, would be useful in building on the analytical framework
developed in this paper. What the analysis here does is to raise
questions about scale and institutional structure in relation to
themes of governance; does the decentralization of energy
issues to the local level provide opportunities for the re-
making of energy landscapes, or does it just reinforce existing
directions? Currently this remains unclear, but there are pow-
erful political and commercial actors in Kenya against whose
interest decentralization may be seen to act. It may also be that
in Malawi, where similar systems exist but where centralized
control is not as well established, decentralization of state
functions has a better chance to evolve.
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